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Lacanian psychoanalysis cannot disregard its debts to philosophy, especially 
continental philosophy. Lacan’s conception of language is derived from multiple 
philosophical sources (i.e., Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard) including 
Heidegger’s philosophy of language and pride of place. Heidegger’s view of language 
prepares the ground for reversing the relationship between language and human 
beings, overcoming common sense about language and the communicative model of 
language. Language is much more than a set of labels; it shapes the human world and 
structures social relations themselves. In addition, language acts as a social link. The 
function of language as a social link allows us to think of it in relation to the Law and 
the very function of this human subjectivity. In reference to the Other of the Law and 
language, the subject finds her recognition, and this implies that the language is not 
reducible to communication. The process of technical-scientific domination of 
Western institutions leads to a reduction of their functions to the formal aspects, 
which may lead to a reification of the human as well as a state of alienation. 
 
Introduction 
According to Heidegger (1959), philosophical reflection on language cannot fail to 
start from an initial and fundamental methodological distance from the different 
disciplines (from linguistics to psychology) that deal with language. While these 
disciplines tend to define language as a system of signs useful in conveying some 
meanings (the most widespread conception), philosophy deals with language itself. 
While recognizing the value of these disciplines, philosophical reflection must be able 
to ignore them—that is, it must be able to place brackets around the datum of 
common sense according to which one speaks to say something and transmit a 
message (Heidegger, 1959). The conception of language as communication considers 
it on a level of exteriority,2 with respect to which philosophical reflection must 
therefore abstract, and considers words merely as labels of ‘real’ things. 
                                                
1	Correspondence	concerning	this	article	should	be	addressed	to	Department	of	
Political	 and	 Social	 Sciences,	 Palazzo	 Pedagaggi,	 Via	 Vittorio	 Emanuele	 II	 49,	
95131	Catania,	e-mail	darioalparone@gmail.com.	
2	“The	 Greek	 word	 that	 corresponds	 to	 our	 “language”	 is	 ϒλῶσσα,	 “tongue”.	
Language	 is	 φωνή	 σημαίντική,	 a	 vocalization	 which	 signifies	 something.	 This	
correct	 but	 externally	 contrived	 representation	 of	 language,	 as	 “expression”,	








In the Heideggerian philosophical perspective, language itself carries an intrinsic 
ontological connotation. Speaking, in fact, is not merely the expression of a message 
between two speaking beings but founds the very being of the things of which it 
speaks: The word is already a thing in and of itself (Heidegger, 1959). In this 
perspective, as something more than a mere tool endowed to human beings to share 
experiences, language (Λογος) is linked to the act of laying (λέγειν) (Heidegger, 
1954). Language is linked to the presentation of things in a “gathering laying-
before”, and for this reason, it can be understood through a precise type of listening: 
Listening to the silence of language means going beyond the simple mechanical 
beating of sound on the eardrum.3 Language, as Λογος, requires a listening that 
differs from hearing of everyday life: 
 
“Not to me”, i.e., not to this one who is talking; you are not to heed the 
vocalization of his talk. You never hear properly so long as your ears hang 
upon the sound and flow of a human voice in order to snatch up for yourselves 
a manner of speaking. Heraclitus begins the saying with a rejection of hearing 
as nothing but the passion of the ears. But this rejection is founded on a 
reference to proper hearing (Heidegger, 1954, p. 67). 
 
It is in this orientation of hearing how to listen that we can take in language as the 
reference to the things themselves and not as meanings or messages in which the 
represented is already provided in a prefiguration offered in common sense. There is 
something more in such a hearing: Language speaks and, as Λογος, places the being 
of things in themselves, “the being of the essent”. Therefore, what would make a 
difference in the philosophical conception of language is its listening point, whence it 
follows that it is not so much man who speaks as the language (Heidegger, 1959). 
Language and Speaking Being 
Distinguishing between the conception of language as a speaker and as an instrument 
of communication is a fundamental operation that became a cardinal principle in the 
psychoanalytic theorization of Lacan (Di Ciaccia & Recalcati, 2000, p. 45; 
Richardson, 2003, p. 17; Meyer, 2007), which was translated into French ‘Logos’ by 
Heidegger (Heidegger, 2013). Moreover, in Being and Time the ordinary use of 
                                                                                                                                       
as	his	guiding	word,	so	as	to	think	in	this	word	the	Being	of	beings”	(Heidegger,	
1954,	pp.	77–78). 
3	Some	 authors	 have	 noticed	 a	 possible	 comparison	 between	 Heideggerian’s	
listening	 of	 being	 and	 Freudian	 psychoanalytic	 listening	 in	 the	 patient’s	
discourse.	 In	 this	 perspective,	 Lacan’s	 ‘return	 to	 Freud’,	 placing	 language	 as	 a	
fundamental	 element,	 would	 account	 for	 the	 Heideggerian	 perspective	 on	
language	 (that	 is,	 a	 non-connotative	 model):	 through	 the	 talking	 cure,	 patient	
language	 becomes	 central	 to	 achieving	 truth	 (Richardson,	 2003,	 pp.	 19–20).	 A	
word	is	considered	the	signifier	in	itself	regardless	of	the	intentional	meaning	it	
carries.		




language typical of everyday life was subjected to strong philosophical criticism and 
referred to as idle talk, a form of being inauthentic in one’s own way of being in the 
world (Heidegger, 1953, pp. 156-159). From these philosophical coordinates, the 
psychoanalytic understanding of language assumes a different value than the purely 
psychological one. It is conceived not as a simple instrument of mediation between 
individuals but rather as a fabric that organizes and structures social relations (Gurgel, 
2009). Language, in particular, mediates the relation between an individual and her 
subjective experience of the internal (emotions, sensations) and external (material 
things) world; it may shape experiences themselves (Cimatti, 2016a). This perspective 
is radically opposed to the empiricist conception of language, according to which 
there is an isomorphism between mind and reality, a mirroring relationship between 
subjective experience and external reality, in which language would only be a set of 
labels indicating the things of the world (Cimatti 2016b)4. In this sense, Lacan 
describes the relationship of the human being with language in terms of ‘field’— that 
is, as a place within which the speaking being is inscribed before her biological birth 
(which is therefore subsequent to her symbolic birth). These reflections may lead 
psychoanalysts to say that the unconscious—what inhabits the human in the most in-
depth and rooted way—is structured like a language5. 
 
It is clear that, in both the Heideggerian philosophical perspective and in the Lacanian 
psychoanalytic one, language goes far beyond the pure and simple communication 
between individuals,6 as subjects exchange, in full consciousness and awareness, 
messages and meanings, almost as if they were goods.7 In this sense, we can observe 
                                                
4	In	this	regard,	it	seems	appropriate	to	indicate	that	this	also	implies	a	criticism	
of	 those	epistemological	positions	coincident	with	 the	 logical	positivism,	which	
were	overcome	in	the	current	epistemological	debate	(Franco,	2018).		
5	This	conception	of	language	as	a	field	of	relational	structuring	that	precedes	the	








6	“This	 conscious	 subject,	master,	makes	 the	difference	between	 linguistics	and	
psychoanalysis.	 Their	 epistemological	 domains	 are	 distinct.	 Linguists	 and	
psychoanalysts	 listen	 to	 some	 words,	 but	 in	 a	 different	 way.	 The	 first	 try	 to	
describe	languages,	to	build	a	scientific	theory	of	their	operation.	Their	concern	
is	objectivity,	the	general,	thus	following	the	Aristotelian	path.	Thus,	they	pursue	




conscious	 subject	 constituted	 the	 implicit	 philosophy	 of	 classical	 political	
economy	 and	 that	Marx	was	 criticizing	 its	 “economic”	 version	 in	 rejecting	 any	
idea	of	“homo	economicus”,	in	which	man	is	defined	as	the	conscious	subject	of	




how Heidegger’s perspective on language, wanting to overcome the perspective of a 
language as a means of communication and naming world objects, is proposed above 
all as a metaphysical perspective that wants to be an alternative to the model that is at 
the foundation of the liberal political vision (Woodson, 2020), a critical political 
perspective which is also consistent with Heidegger’s political choices (Nelson, 
2017). In our perspective, man is instead spoken by language and is traumatised, even 
in the body, by the signifier. In psychoanalysis, this relationship is often described 
with the pun motérialité (Lecoeur, 2016), as a synthesis of word and matter, to 
indicate the material effect that words have on the subject and on her body (the word 
is already a thing). 
 
The extent to which man is marked by language is evident from the early stages of 
childhood development. From birth, man is thrown into a state of biological 
incompleteness and instinctual deficiency that makes one extremely dependent on 
one’s environment. This obliges the infans to build tools to express one’s own needs 
and address them to the Other on which one totally depends (Romano, 1989). In such 
a state of dependence, the wail, the cry, and the scream become primordial forms of 
invocation until the word is set up as a representation of something that is missing 
(symbol), as a question addressed to the Other concerning one’s appetite, which, 
however, was already being under-communicated. The question so mediated by the 
word is satiated not by the object that it could receive as an answer but by the very 
gesture of the answer by the Other (that is, the signifier). Thus, language, from the 
beginning, possesses a person in her needs, from which she is always decentralized: 
Her questions do not ask for specific satisfaction in an object but convey a desire, 
which in turn is satisfied with its dissatisfaction, with that emptiness which 
corresponds to the very desire that is the Other’s desire: “this subjectification consists 
simply in posing the mother as this primordial being who may be there or not. In the 
child’s own desire this being is essential. What does the subject desire? It’s not simply 
a matter of appetition for the mother’s care, contact or even her presence, but of 
appetition for her desire” (Lacan, 1957-58, pp. 165–166). Thus, the fundamental 
dependence that requires care becomes, in the symbolic mediation of language, a 
request for recognition (Cimino, 2019). In this sense, language is much more than 
communication for man. It is the very figure of one’s desire that is of one being 
subject and, therefore, of one being in the world. 
 
Starting from this structure of the relationship between subject and language, it is 
noted that the latter acts as an operator of interpersonal relationships, ensuring third 
parties’ role, mediation, and a symbolic guarantee of the relationship. The effect of 
the structuring of social relations takes on a specific consistency in the Law’s 
institution as an organization of the subjectivity in relation to the social structure: “It 
is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance—it simply makes a 
barred subject out of an almost natural barrier. For it is pleasure that sets limits to 
jouissance, pleasure as what binds incoherent life together, until another prohibition—
this one being unchallengeable—arises from the regulation that Freud discovered as 
the primary process and relevant law of pleasure” (Lacan, 1966b, p. 696). Thus, in a 
language recognized as something more than communication, even the Law takes on 
further meaning with respect to the simple regulation of relationships between 
                                                                                                                                       
his	 needs	 and	 that	 subject	 of	 need	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 ultimate	 and	 constitutive	
element	of	every	society”	(Althusser,	1996,	p.	115).	




individuals, administration of the sovereign will of a narcissistic subject.8 The Law is 
a symbolic place in which the subject finds an orientation in her life, thus organizing 
her action and desire within the horizon of the Third (the Other of Law and 
Language): 
 
The uppercase Third is the reference provided as a logical third to which every 
relationship of legality responds within the culture and the very idea of 
society. It indicates the horizon of law. The point from which it is possible to 
conceive of that law as a system of rules merely reflects the function of a third 
party […] (Legendre, 1989b, p. 57, our translation). 
Language and Society 
In this perspective, if the language is the structure that centres the human in the social 
relationship, making her arise as a subject in front of the Law, then the legal 
institutions of law are the “objectification” of social relationships (Honneth, 2014 p. 
124). In the function of reférence (that is, reference of the symbolic authority to 
another: “in-name-of”), the law formally establishes the function of the third party, 
guaranteeing the subject’s recognition as the holder of rights and desires. According 
to Legendre (1989a), in this social organization, the subject is born within the social 
world, and this allows her to request self-recognition as a desiring, speaking being. 
However, this organization is increasingly in crisis in contemporary society because 
the law has been reduced to a mere administrative instrument, which has eroded its 
genealogical status (that is, its symbolic foundation in the form of “in-name-of”). The 
technical-scientific vision of the Law reduces the organization of the symbolic 
structure to mere technical functionality, useful for regulating only individual 
relationships within a context of trade emptied of the horizon of meaning (Romano, 
2002): “It is true that the rise of scientific rationality led to the preclusion 
(‘foreclosure’) of another form of reason, one that preceded today’s form yet – 
especially in view of legal practice – has therefore not disappeared” (Michels, 2013). 
It is a process of degradation of the Law from the guarantor of the recognition to the 
mere functional administration of the relations of autonomous market subjects, which 
already leads to a pre-philosophical (pre-Heideggerian) vision of language as a mere 
communication tool and message vehicle. Therefore, we could say that the reduction 
of the Law to its strictly functional (technical-administrative) aspects, typical of 
bureaucracy, refers to a use of the typical language of everyday life—that is, of that 
inauthentic being which, as stated above, Heidegger called idle talk. It is not by 
                                                
8	See,	 in	 this	 regard,	 the	 distinction	 made	 by	 Lacan	 between	 the	 symbolic	
relationship	regulated	by	the	Law	and	the	imaginary	function	that	is	held	on	the	
narcissistic	structure:	“We	must	distinguish,	therefore,	between	the	principle	of	








chance, with regard to the function of the Law, that Heidegger distinguished the law 
of natural sciences from normative law: “A law of nature is a principle of explanation, 
a norm is a principle of evaluation [Beurteilung]” (Heidegger, 1987, p. 28). In this 
sense, the reduction of the principle of reason immanent in the Law to technical 
rationality implies the exclusion of the poietic function (‘creative’ by a constructionist 
view) of the Law itself. This process, in our opinion, coincides with the adoption of a 
certain type of language understood as mere communication—that is, only as its 
technical aspects. 
 
Thus, the Law, in its degradation from a symbolic order to an abstract operation, 
comes with degradation to the social level of the language itself. In the dimension of 
the global market, social life increasingly tends to be administered according to an 
economic model, in which the widespread language is increasingly of a technical and 
evaluative nature (Romano, 2002). The technical knowledge that permeates and 
turned into a desert the symbolic universe, changes the language from evocative (with 
its reference to a sense horizon) to numerical, thus reducing itself to a vehicle of 
administrative and accounting provisions. From this perspective, it can be pointed out 
that the legal institutions of Western democratic societies are marked by the risk of 
producing a form of extraneousness among citizens, precisely through a disconnect 
between social relations and juridical regulation, which resembles an abstract 
formality and incomprehensibility that can lead to social pathologies of freedom 
(Honneth, 2014, pp. 86–88). From a psychoanalytic point of view, this process can be 
interpreted as being due to a lack of possibility of subjecting the signifiers conveyed 
by the institutions: The language is not an expression of the social bond but is lived as 
a stranger to the life of the subject with alienation effects (Alparone, 2019). The 
number replaces the letter, so the language no longer organizes the subjective 
recognition but becomes a mere digit that communicates itself. In other words, it is a 
language and a law that is self-founded and self-justified in its functionality and not as 
a genealogy of the symbolic authority (using a Legendrian term) (Avitabile, 2004). 
 
In the loss of the symbolic recognition value of language, we could consider the 
contemporary Western society as a “communication society”9—that is, a society in 
which language is reduced to an advertising vehicle, an instrument to communicate 
and execute commercial transactions, a numerical digit to indicate the price of a 
product, the balance to be paid (Romano, 2002). In this world, the individual 
rediscovers her absolute private freedom, also de-prived of the field of recognition 
that would ensure its effective realization (Honneth, 2014). The desire of the 
individual, left free from the constraints that social and symbolic constraints operate, 
is not fulfilled in a claim of normative character but precipitates in the condition of 
appetite, of a need satisfied by the object of consumption (Romano, 2002). In the 
society of communication, we must deal with free individuals without authentic 
autonomy (Perniola, 2004). They are merely reduced to ‘Ego’, atomic subjects devoid 
of symbolic mediations. For this reason, psychoanalysis’ task also assumes a different 
connotation compared to what it may have assumed previously: It “does not consist in 
                                                
9 In this regard, see Luhmann’s text on Mass Media (1996) that reads the Western 
social reality as based on the communication process, which affects production not 
only of the reality (through the news) but also of the individuality of the spectator (pp. 
71–75). 




adapting people to the social and communicative status quo, but rather in re-
establishing their relationship with the symbolic order” (Perniola, 2004, p. 52). 
 
In the symbolic degradation of language, the communication society, as a society of 
economically oriented exchanges, achieves the maximum technical potential, the 
same that Heidegger (1954) highlighted as a ‘threat’ to man: It diverts one from 
recollection and prevents one from listening, in the silence of language, to the being 
of things. 
Conclusion 
Psychoanalysis employs a conception of language quite different from that typical of 
common sense or psychology. Both Heidegger and Lacanian psychoanalysis disregard 
the linguistic model as a set of functional labels to indicate ‘things’. Language 
conceived of only as communication is a reduction from a psychoanalytic point of 
view, which also considers it something that provides shape to the world, something 
that shapes social relations and structures them. In this sense, Lacan takes up the 
Heideggerian conception that it is not the man who speaks but language. Lacan 
further radicalized this thesis by saying that man is spoken by language. Therefore, 
language is not a device, a function in the service of the speaking being, but it 
precedes and surpasses them. Man is shaped by language, and the world assumes 
infinite possibilities of meanings in language to the point that we could say the world 
is built linguistically. 
 
What Heidegger noted regarding language as something related to being is also found 
in works by Lacan and has a fundamental role in the clinic. Through the word, the 
analyzing can give shape to the suffering that inhabits the symptom, he can put, in 
words, the symptomatic jouissance that freezes the existence of the subject in the 
circle of repetition. Therefore, through the talking cure, it is possible to touch that 
real, that being, in Heideggerian terms, which is at the heart of subjective suffering, 
thus opening the subject to new possibilities that break the logic of the repetition of 
the ghost. 
 
Falling back into the logic of language as communication has radical effects. One of 
the most evident is undoubtedly in the institutional context, in which the function of 
the Law is no longer the expression of a common feeling, of the social bond, and 
authority appears to the subject in all its abstract arbitrariness. The effect of a 
technical-bureaucratic language, which therefore does not refer to a logic of reference 
and does not convey any recognition of the subject, is to make the individual perceive 
a sort of separation and estrangement from the institution, which no longer represents 
her because it does not convey any recognition of rights-desires. This is what has been 
observed in our Western societies increasingly marked by populism—that is, by large 
masses that no longer recognize themselves in the political power and the established 
laws. In the decay of language from the authentic expression of the social bond and 
the symbolic order to a technical-communicative function, a deterioration of the Law 
is also produced. Indeed, if in the first model of language the principle of ignorantia 
legis non excusat applies from the time when the Law was the very expression of the 
social bond, in language-communication, the institution is recognised as alien and the 
Law is potentially lived as persecutory (Alparone, 2018). In this way the 
contemporary function of the Law is reduced to the Super Ego (Marret, 2012). 





In this sense, it seems essential to rediscover the philosophical roots of the Lacanian 
psychoanalytic conception of language. Heidegger is one of the teachers from whom 
we can draw fundamental lessons for thinking about our psychoanalytic experiences, 
both clinical and social. 
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